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Follow the
LEADER
The Hawke-Keating struggle dominated the media in 
June. But was it worth all the fuss? David Burchell 
argues that there's more to leadership than meets the eye.
T wo events—the NSW election in May and the recent bitterly divisive leader­ship struggle between Bob Hawke and 
Paul Keating—have rewritten the 
script of politics for the near future. Their effects, 
clearly, have been quite different, but they have 
one feature in common; they mark the end of an 
era for left-of-centre politics in Australia. Labor's 
decade of triumph between 1983 and 1991 has 
been replaced by a new age of anxiety.
The significance of the NSW result is canvassed at length 
elsewhere in this issue of ALR. However, it raises one 
important point which is dose to the heart of the argument 
I want to mount here. And that is that—with the exception 
of a few individuals—almost nobody, Right or Left, 
predicted the outcome of the election in NSW, and almost 
no one, once the result had actually been posted, could very
clearly or coherently explain why it had happened. The 
mass media, in their confusion, leapt to the snake-oil ex­
planations beloved of them—it was all due to bad slogans 
and PR, or the unpopularity of Mr Greiner as a leader, 
Forget for the moment that, prior to the election, no one in 
the media had seen fit to criticise any significant element 
of the Liberals' campaign, or that Mr Greiner was, by all 
the polling evidence, far more popular than Mr Carr. The 
result was, on the face of it, inscrutable, and any explana­
tion had to be imported from outside, as it were— from the 
magical mirror-world of advertising and market research.
Just as importantly, though, few if any in the Labor camp 
realised what was about to happen. Labor, like the Coali­
tion and the media, assumed that the political and 
econom ic circu m stances— alm ost u n iversally  un­
favourable to Labor—would inevitably create a certain 
electoral outcome: that, if you like, certain electoral effects 
can be 'read off' from certain external economic or political 
conditions. They were wrong, as such reasoning is always 
to some extent wrong. Political determinism of that kind
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Keating: Eyes on the hot seat.
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more often reflects the outlook of the analyst than of society 
at large.
What the result highlighted, in short, was the poverty of 
the analytical armoury customarily employed by jour­
nalists and commentators to 'explain' politics. This is not 
to suggest that there is one, 'real', explanation to the NSW 
election result (or almost anything else), and that the 
'correct' analysis (whatever that might be) will somehow 
yield that answer. But it certainly does suggest that there 
is some element missing in the framework used by media 
commentators to try to connect the happenings in par­
liamentary politics with those in the outside world. One 
way of looking at that 'gap' between politics and society 
in conventional political analysis is to look at the role of 
leadership in the recent tussle for the prime ministership 
between Bob Hawke and Paul Keating.
One thing which couldn't be said about the federal leader­
ship challenge was that it was unexpected. The mechanics 
of leadership challenges are something the press gallery 
does know something about, and the fervid atmosphere of 
alliance and intrigue is, after all, the preferred habitus of 
the media's opinion makers. It's well known that Paul 
Keating wanted to challenge as early as January but was 
restrained by a number of factors including the Gulf War. 
We also now know why he felt the leadership was so 
rightfully 'his': Bob Hawke had promised it to him.
“Hawke - defensive, 
snarling, and  with a  
m isp laced  sense o f his own 
gra  vitas”
One of the most remarkable aspects of the challenge—or 
should it be called the first challenge?—was the breakup 
of opinions outside the hothouse dimate of Parliament 
House. Just about every quality newspaper in the country, 
as well as a number of the tabloids, editorialised in favour 
of Paul Keating; the press gallery was near-unanimously 
pro-Keating; and nearly all the reportage after the event 
was certain that the labor Caucus had made a dreadful 
mistake. By contrast, the opinion polls continued to be 
overwhelmingly unhelpful to Keating; Bob Hawke is hard­
ly popular at dte moment, whatever his backers may daim, 
but Paul Keating is still unreservedly loathed in the elec­
torate.
How are we to explain this? Is there some crude form of 
capital-logic at work trying to force Keating to the prime 
ministership 'in the interests of capital' and against the 
wishes of the electorate? Hardly—unless Bob Hawke is to 
be considered some arch-nemesis of the business com­
munity. More helpful in trying to explain the line-up of 
forces in the Keating-Hawke struggle is to unpack the 
significance and symbolism of the two candidates in terms 
of the massive political drama being played out in 
Australian politics at the moment.
Perhaps the most striking contrast between the two can­
didates was their post-challenge press conferences. There 
was Paul Keating, cool, controlled and with a marvellous 
sense of die theatre of the occasion. And there was Bob 
Hawke, defensive, snarling, and with a distressingly 
misplaced sense of his own gra vitas. The contrast ex­
emplified at least one of the reasons which makes the press 
gallery such avid Keating apostles. Keating's sense of 
theatre (or 'vaudeville', as he puts it, with his customary 
lack of respect for the pretensions of his audience) touches 
their deepest instinct that politics is, in the last resort, a 
kind of tragic drama in which the key element is the clash 
of forceful but fatally flawed personalities.
In this regard the press gallery is half right. It's simply not 
adequate to say—as many on the Left have undoubtedly 
been muttering grumpily—that the theatre of the leader­
ship struggle is a distraction from 'real' politics, that 
politics 'out there' in the community is the 'real' agenda, 
and that the Canberra theatre is consequently a sham. In 
the first case, the struggle over die direction of the govern­
ment at perhaps the most crucial time in Australia's 
modem political history can hardly be irrelevant. Perhaps 
equally significant, though, is the role tha t leadership plays 
in a symbolic sense in public political discourse. Leaders 
are important not just because, by smiling sweetly, they 
may win die hearts of people too foolish to know the 'real' 
issues at stake. Rather, leaders are important because into 
their public personae are poured a range of political sym­
bols and images which do relate to real issues and policies, 
but which are expressed in this human guise, as it were, in 
shorthand form. It is in this light that the Hawke/Keating 
dichotomy becomes important.
Probably no one has exploited this merging of public 
persona with a repertoire of political symbols more suc­
cessfully than Bob Hawke. So successful has he been that 
many people in the wider community simply associate the 
Labor Party with what they understand by the words 'Bob 
Hawke'. This makes Hawke's public persona (which is, we 
are told, quite different to his private personality) very 
important to him. In particular, we are told, Hawke hates 
to have his integrity questioned. Even more obviously, he 
hates to admit to lying, even when it is obvious that he has 
done so.
The media made much during the leadership tussle of the 
lack of credibility of a prime minister who lied to the 
electorate. More to the point, one might have thought, is 
the lack of credibility of a prime minister who can't admit 
having lied to the electorate. The ability to admit one's past 
untruths is a kind of badge of ordinary humility, a 
demonstration that the liar is willing to be taken down a 
peg or two. Bob Hawke's inability to do that—his over- I 
weening sense of his own dignity—is the fatal flaw of his I 
relationship with the electorate. Pinocchio, we are told, J
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discovered that when he lied his nose grew. In Bob 
Hawke's case, when he dissimulates—as he does so 
badly—it is his syntax, rather than his nose, which takes 
its revenge. The long rambling sentences start to unravel. 
And there is a glimpse of a private persona quite unlike 
that known to and beloved of the electorate.
Interestingl y, though, while the mass media ha vebeen very 
conscious of the opinion polls which show Hawke's rela­
tive popularity with Paul Keating in the electorate, there 
has beat remarkably little analysis of what this means in 
political terms. After all, the electorate empathises with 
Hawke not simply as an avuncular father-figure, but as a 
prime minister. One might wonder then what his prime 
ministership symbolises.
“Keating, like M argaret 
Thatcher, is a ’con v ic tion '  
p o litic ia n ”
The dearest symbolic resonance in Bob Hawke's 'long-run­
ning love affair with the Australian people' (as unexpec­
tedly sentimental journalists are wont to describe it) is 
compassion and a sense of the fair go. Compassion because 
the essence of Hawke's rhetorical appeal, amid the twisted 
syntax and half-hidden bad humour, is—to put it simply— 
a vocabulary of caring. At times this vocabulary of caring 
creates problems for Hawke, such as when he exhibits an 
almost desperate desire to have a more caring message to 
give than that which has often been available to him in the 
austere climate of the 80s. One could read his notorious 'No 
child will live in poverty by 1990* remark in this manner.
The essence of the child poverty message, as originally 
formulated, was that rational individuals who used 
government allowances wisely could raise their children's 
living standards above the poverty line— which is actually 
a rather bureaucratic and economistic way of looking at 
things, given that a great many people are not aware of 
their entitlements, and are thus unable to utilise them (even 
assuming that utilising them will indeed rescue them from 
poverty). Hawke was not content with this dour message: 
he wanted to be able to present the electorate with a solu­
tion to the problem of child poverty, with a caring fait 
accompli. He wanted to demonstrate a government inter­
vention which consciously and deliberately removed suf­
fering from the shoulders of Australian children and 
parents. The resulting furore exposed his leadership to 
ridicule—and for a remarkably similar reason to that 
which currently has his leadership exposed to ridicule. Bob 
Hawke wants to be liked, but he wants to be liked in 
particular in the manner in which a kindly, caring parent 
is liked: to be trusted implicitly, and to be seen to have
dispensed sympathy and shelter. If the message is seen to 
be bogus, the image very rapidly dissipates.
Not even Paul Keating's greatest admirers would daim 
that his image is of a caring leader. Rather he has acquired 
the unenviable image in the electorate at large of the cold 
and calculating 'economic man'—of an individual who 
w eighs up the costs of econom ic decisions in the 
vocabulary of 'the macro balance' and 'the big picture'. 
Contrary to what some journalists may believe, this 
vocabulary has a rather narrow constituency. It may have 
impressed the finance sector in the 80s that a Labor 
treasurer could demonstrate such a consummate grasp of 
economic logic, and be able to present economic concepts 
with such disarming simplidty on the public stage. But to 
most people the vocabulary of economics is only sym­
pathetic if they feel that they themselves (or their family, 
or their community) are benefiting as a result of all that 
lever-pulling and brake-holding. In the mid-80s, with 
record unemployment levels and a buoyant level of 
demand, this was plausible to many. In the early 90s it 
seems plausible to very few. This will be a terrific obstacle 
to a renovation of Keating's image should he actually 
become PM within the next few months. He will have to 
develop, not just a warmer image ('the family man ' will 
undoubtedly be top of the list), but also a new vocabulary, 
and this will mark a sharp and possibly (for him) discom­
forting break with his established public persona
However, there is another point to these widely divergent 
public images. The Labor image worked in the 80s because 
Tabor' meant Hawke and Keating together, as a team. In 
other words, Hawke's caring vocabulary was plausible 
predsely because it was intertwined with the austere 
economic vocabulary of Keating, like sweet and sour. After 
all, most people are suspidous of an idle caring rhetoric— 
something which many on the Left are slow to realise. 
Those political salespeople, whether of the Left or the 
Right, who promise material gain without material pain, 
tend to be regarded with an often well-justified, lack of 
trust This suggests that, whether or not Keating returns to 
the frontbench as leader, a Keating substitute will have to 
be found. Hence the microscopic attention to every ut­
terance of the new treasurer, John Kerin, on the part of the 
media and the finandal markets. There is almost a need for 
Kerin to slip into the Keating persona, to 'become' Keating.
All of this of course is hardly without significance for the 
government's policy direction, no less than for its public 
face. The dedsion of Labor's parliamentary Left to hitch its 
own fate to that of Hawke has prompted the inevitable jibes 
from the press gallery that the government has become a 
'prisoner of the Left'. This is, of course, nonsense, except in 
the obvious sense that Hawke now personally relies on the 
Left's indulgence for his continued survival. However — 
though this has been little noted in the media — it was not 
self-evident that the Left would have pulled so firmly 
behind Hawke in the first place. That it did is worthy of 
examination, particularly in terms of the political sym­
bolism of the two candidates.
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Three reasons suggest themselves. Firstly, the Left hates 
Keating—with a vengeance, and not without reason. After 
all, in the 80s Keating seized the mantle of radical change 
from the Left and made it his own; henceforward the Left 
was reduced in the public eye to the status of a group of 
reactionaries, often arguing lamely for the return to the 
status quo ante of 1983 in economic policy. Moreover, the 
means with which Keating carried out his task of opening 
the Australian economy to the world were both deeply 
flawed and deeply antithetical to the Left. In the shortest 
political shorthand of the postwar era, 'more market* 
meant Right, and less meant Left. Whatever its other fail­
ings, Keating's economic revolution in die 80s fundamen­
tally riled the Left because it seemed to be unravelling the 
many incremental curbs on the market put in place over 
the postwar era, both by regulation and by the extension of 
the public sector. That most of the regulatory regime of 
postwar Australia was dominated less by a leftish desire 
for social justice than a pervasive political culture of pork- 
barrelling was thought to be beside the point Keating was 
the acolyte of 'the market' and for that he will bear the Left's 
continued disapproval, regardless of the ministerial ambi­
tions of one or two disgruntled members.
Secondly, the Left has practical reasons to support Hawke. 
The claim that the Left now 'dominates' the government is 
palpable nonsense, as will rapidly become obvious to all 
but toe most stubborn of commentators. However, for toe 
pragmatic element on the Left led by Brian Howe, Hawke's 
reign has been the time of an unprecedented cohabitation 
of toe factions in government It has been, of course, a very 
unequal partnership ; the governm ent's dom inant 
economic direction has increasingly been driven by a com­
bination of the hardheads in parts of the Centre Left and 
toe Right, with most of toe Left as virtual spectators. How­
ever, unlike other Labor governments, the Hawke govern­
ment has operated by an uneasy style of consensus. Once 
it has become dear where toe numbers lie, an effort is made 
to make decisions at least more palatable to other interests. 
And for those on the Left who accepted that toe govern­
ment was a government, and not (in Lindsay Tanner's 
phrase) simply a collection of warring tribes, this has 
created the possibility for more practical influence on 
policy from toe Left, within the basic direction of govern­
ment strategy, than it has usually been within the capadty 
of the Left to exercise.
M oreover, this has been integrally associated with 
Hawke's leadership style. He is widely described as being 
'a good chair'—of not pushing his own opinions (where he 
has any) too hard, and of generally resting with what he 
understands to be toe feelings of Cabinet. On the other 
hand, Keating, like Margaret Thatcher, is a 'conviction' 
politician, and to the Left this suggests that, as a leader, he 
would try to lead by domination rather than cohabitation. 
And Keating's origins in the NSW Right might be proffered 
in evidence for such suspicions.
Of course, the Keating of today is not the Keating of the 
NSW Right of toe 70s, with all the bully-boy tactics and 
macho mateship which that culture exuded. Come to that.
almost none of the senior Labor figures who have come to 
positions of power through the agency of the NSW Right 
are, in any real sense, part of that culture today—Keating, 
Richardson, Bob Carr all come to mind. To a large extent, 
the NSW Right remains what it always has been: a vehicle 
for ambitious working class boys made good to better 
themselves in the labour movement. The rest of its 
awesome reputation is largely window-dressing for that 
end.
Finally, toe Left supported Hawke because, as I noted 
above, he symbolises the compassionate fare of the govern­
ment, and that compassionate face is more than anything 
else the province of the Left. It is in this respect that 
Keating's departure might seem to open up new horizons 
for the Left in the government A Hawke-Howe govern­
ment might be interpreted as bringing a return to the 
'traditional Labor' equation of Labor and compassion. 
(And the Coronation Hill decision might be proffered in 
evidence of that.)
Yet this is largely a mirage. As I've also noted above, 
compassion is hardly plausible without an economic 
strategy to sustain it— and an econom ic strategy 
dominated by the problems of toe external constraint and 
its implications for the stance of fiscal policy. This should 
not be read as suggesting simply 'a concern for the senti­
ment of the financial markets', as one Left MP put it recent­
ly—although that can hardly be unimportant.
Nevertheless, it certainly does mean that the Left can't 
simply wave goodbye to the Keating years. Important 
elements of the Keating strategy are effectively irreversible. 
Old-style regulation and protectionism is dead —  though 
there is no reason on earth why the alternative has to be 
open-slather deregulation or complete free tradeism. 
Above all, the external constraint is immutable. Australia's 
place in the world economy forbids any simple return to 
old-style reflationismand expansionism. The heavy task of 
the Left is to reconstruct a Left politics which can move 
creatively and innovativel y within these awful constraints. 
Waving farewell to Paul Keating will make surprisingly 
little difference to the weight of that task.
In that sense. Labor's Left is guilty of the mirror-image of 
the problem which afflicts toe press gallery. The press 
gallery associates Keating with all that symbolism of the 
economic process of toe last few years for which it feels 
such enthusiasm, and which Keating, for want of a more 
tasteful way of putting it, made sexy. The Left associates 
Keating with all the features of the economic policies of the 
last decade it loathes. In each case this is to put far too much 
weight onto the role of Keating toe individual, and far too 
little on toe much wider forces he's come to symbolise.
Win or lose in the continuing leadership duel, Keating's 
legacy will be with Labor for a long time yet.
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